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Introduction 
This paper contains a comparative analysis of the case studies in the 
Euwareness project. The Euwareness project was a European Union 
sponsored 6 country study on the development of integral water management 
in the context of the European Water Framework Directive Apart from 
country screenings also cases were studied of tributary river basin areas. In 
these case studies we looked at the accessibility of water systems as a natural 
resource for various users and use functions. In that context we considered 
rivalries between users and use functions as an indicator of an insufficiently 
sustainable use of water systems. A water system means a discrete and 
homogeneous element of surface water or groundwater such as an aquifer, a 
lake, a reservoir, a stretch of stream, river or canal, an estuary, or a stretch of 
coastal water. We assume that the sustainable use of water systems requires 
an optimum distribution of use options among present and future users and 
use functions. An example of distribution of use options is the distribution 
between upstream and downstream users. An activity that pollutes water 
upstream (using a stream to discharge waste or waste water) could interfere 
with the downstream use of that stream for drinking water supply. Or an 
upstream weir could impede the downstream flow and flow dependent use 
options. Such rivalries not only exist between different (heterogeneous) use 
types, they may also appear among homogeneous uses (uses of the same 
type). In arid areas farmers may feel the need to co-ordinate the water use for 
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irrigation. Or in the field of fisheries, quotas may be used as an instrument to 
prevent the depletion of fish stocks. 
 
A water system is often demarcated as a river or water basin, which means 
the area of land from which all surface water run-off flows through a 
sequence of streams, rivers and, possibly, lakes into the sea via a single river 
mouth, estuary or delta. This implies that a water basin not only includes the 
water beds, but also the surrounding area of land from which the water bed 
receives and transports the water run-off. In this view the land use of river 
flood plains for urban development should be considered as a use that 
interferes with the use of flood plains for river dynamics and flooding. 
Another example of a water use rivalry in a water basin could be the rivalry 
between drainage of land for agricultural development versus the function of 
a minimum groundwater level for nature conservation in that area. 
 
The main question for the researchers was whether the regime for the 
management of a water system provided sufficient guarantees for its 
sustainable use, by diminishing or preventing rivalries between users and use 
functions. To answer this question we focused on institutional regimes for 
natural resources, both from a public governance perspective (Bressers & 
Kuks 2001) and a perspective of private property and use rights (Ostrom 
1990; Bromley 1991). The first perspective focuses on the management of 
natural resources from a public domain (although in interaction with private 
actors). The second perspective focuses on the accessibility of a natural 
resource in a broader sense, including the private domain, the domain of 
collective property and use, as well as the domain of ‘no property’ (res 
nullius). By applying both perspectives in a complementary way, we have 
developed a framework for understanding the access rights that users or use 
functions may possess or claim, and the proportion between and 
exclusiveness of the various domains. For instance, the option of having 
intervention from the public domain could be blocked by the existence of a 
private domain based on long term concessions for water use (which, 
especially in Spain and Switzerland, appears to be a problem of 
redistributing water access rights). On the other hand, attempts initiated by 
the public domain to redistribute private property and use rights could be 
effective in providing a better access to or protection of alternative users and 
use functions. Another question could be how the exclusiveness of the public 
domain is interpreted by public authorities. Does the public domain offer 
equal access to society as a whole, or are specific users and/or use functions 
discriminated against in favor of others? A public domain could appear as a 
private domain in the hands of society at large, or as a ‘no property’ domain, 
owned by no one and thus equally accessible to all. 
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We interpret ‘regimes’ as institutional resource regimes, comprised of a 
public governance component and a property rights component. The 
combination of those components can be more or less integrated and 
influences the sustainability of the use of the given natural resource. In turn, 
these regimes, or rather their property rights and governance components, 
are influenced by external change agents, which leads to regime change. 
Figure 1 illustrates these dynamics1 as will be investigated in the case study 
comparison.  
 
Figure 1,  Research model 
 
External Change Agents     Institutional Resource  
and Conditions        Regime 
 
 
Change agents:   
European Union policy and      
regime changes          Property and  
National policy and          use rights 
regime changes 
Problem pressure 
Other agents     
    
 Conditions:     
Tradition of cooperation       Elements of  
Joint problem          public governance 
Joint opportunity 
Credible alternative threat 
Institutional interfaces 
 
 
 
 
 
As the figure shows there are three groups of variables. These are linked by 
the central relationships in the research questions: 
1. How far do more integrated water resource regimes lead to more 
sustainable resource use? 
2. What change agents and conditions cause shifts towards more integrated 
regimes? 
 
1 We acknowledge the existence of several other possible feedback relations, but they are 
not presented in the graph since they receive less attention in our discussion. 
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The integration of the ‘institutional resource regime’ is the central variable. 
Question 1 should show the results of such integration. Question 2 should 
provide explanations for it. 
 
In the next section, we start by explaining the regime components, the 
factors that might contribute to the integration of resource regimes, and our 
expectation of how more integrated regimes might benefit a more 
sustainable resource use. Section 3 goes into the methodology of the study 
and the comparison. Section 4 shows the results of the comparative analysis. 
Section 5 concludes with an outlook on the implications of these results for 
the European water management policies.  
 
2 The public governance and property rights 
components  
2.1 Governance 
The governance structure of a regime can be analysed along five dimensions 
or elements. Thus, the governance structure of a regime can be parsed into 
(for an elaboration and basis in literature see Bressers and Kuks, 2003):  
1. Levels and scales of governance (Where? - Multi-level: not necessarily 
administrative levels; ‘governance’ assumes the general multilevel 
character of policy making and implementation) 
2. Actors in the policy network (Who? - Multi-actor: ‘governance’ assumes 
the multi-actor character of policy making and implementation) 
3. Problem perception and policy objectives (What and why? - Multi-
faceted: ‘governance’ assumes the multifaceted character of the problem 
perceptions and objectives of policy making and implementation)  
4. Strategy and instruments (How? - Multi-instrumental: ‘governance’ 
assumes the multi-instrumental character of policy strategies) 
5. Responsibilities and resources for implementation (With what? - Multi-
resource-based: ‘governance’ assumes the complex multi-resource basis 
for policy implementation)   
 
This elaboration of governance is used in the Euwareness study, for instance 
to determine the degree of coherence of governance.  
2.2 Property and use rights 
Property rights arrangements are the second important component of an 
institutional resource regime (cf. Fuchs 2003). In the context of resource 
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research, the property rights approach is particularly worthy of mention 
(Bromley 1989, 1991; Bromley & Hodge 1990; Burns & Dietz 1996; Feeny 
et al. 1990; Schlager & Ostrom 1992; Libecap 1993; Devlin & Grafton 
1998), specifically the common-pool resources theory (Ostrom 1990; 1992a; 
1992b; 1994; 1997; Ostrom et al. 1994). According to Ostrom, property and 
use rights exercise a decisive influence on the use of natural resources in that 
they determine who has access to the resource and when and in what form it 
can be used. They define the position of interacting individuals in the 
community with respect to the utilization of scarce resources (Pejovich 
1975: 40; Young 1994). As Stubblebine (1975) argues, the definition of 
property rights becomes necessary as soon as two individuals share a living 
environment. Robinson Crusoe didn’t need them, until Friday’s arrival on 
the island. Property rights are created or changed in response to economic 
forces, as opportunities to gain arise (North 1989: 1324; Feeny 1988: 273; 
Ensminger & Rutten 1991). 
Property rights generally include the rights to use and consume the asset, 
to exclude others from the use of the asset, to change its form and substance, 
to obtain income from it, and to transfer these rights either in their entirety 
through sale or temporarily through, for instance, rental (Barzel 1989; 
Furubotn & Pejovich 1975; Kasper & Streit 1998). They are generally not 
unrestricted. This fact is important to remember in the context of debates on 
the environmentally desirable property regime. Private property rights are 
often treated as absolutes, which in reality they rarely are. Rather than 
having to choose between private property regimes, common property 
regimes, and state ownership, the imposition of some constraints on private 
property is often a reasonable alternative. Governments, for example, often 
impose regulations limiting the owners’ options in terms of how they can use 
their resource. 
Property rights should be conceived of as bundles of rights. With respect 
to environmental resources, for instance, property rights exist and frequently 
differ for the stock of a resource and the produced yield or the goods and 
services derived from a resource. ‘Ownership of the resource’ would thus 
pertain to a specific bundle of rights the owner holds with respect to the 
resource. The owner may, for example, hold the right to farm the land, but 
not to kill rare species on the land. What specific rights are regarded to be 
‘normally’ included with the property title and to what extent these rights 
can also be unbundled, differs between different periods and cultures, and 
also between resources or other goods. Different ‘property regimes’ are 
likely to exist with respect to the attributes of many environmental resources. 
Property rights and regimes for such a resource thus tend to form a complex 
structure with several layers and dimensions. 
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In the context of the Euwareness project, the ‘coherence’ of this layering of 
property rights is of particular importance, because some combinations of 
property rights can also evoke rival demands for water resources. Farmers’ 
rights to extract water for irrigating their land can rival each other in times of 
scarcity, such as in Ostrom’s early irrigation studies, focusing on 
homogenous uses. In both the case of scarcity in a homogenous and 
heterogeneous use situation, property rights compete with each other. For 
instance, this is for instance the case when some farmers have the right to 
use a pond as a source for irrigation water, while the local fishery association 
has the fishing rights for that small lake. The objective of policy intervention 
in the context of an institutional resource regime, then, can lead to a co-
ordination and harmonization of rights to different attributes of the resource 
and pursue sustainable management through a reduction in conflict between 
these rights.  
2.3 Change toward more complex resource regimes 
In general, we expect the elements of public governance (and the regime in 
general, i.e. including property rights) to exert a stabilizing influence on each 
other. This stabilizing influence occurs through processes of mutual 
adaptation of values, cognitions and resources. Thus, while changes in the 
elements of the governance pattern can be caused by changes in other 
elements, ultimately these changes must have external sources affecting one 
or more elements from the outside. Mutual adaptation mechanisms that, 
without external ‘disturbances’, have a stabilizing influence become the 
mechanisms by which substantial changes in one of the elements are 
followed by responding changes in other elements, resulting in complete 
regime changes.  
 
Sources of change 
In principle, external change agents can enter the scene through all of the 
elements that are discerned in the regime. There is a difference, though. 
Property rights might be conceived as somewhat more stable and less 
oriented towards invoking change than the elements of public governance. 
That means that, although property rights may act as a powerful context for 
developments in public governance, changing governance patterns is not 
their subject per se. On the other hand, interventions from the governance 
side often have the specific and deliberate intent to change property rights. 
External change agents for the governance pattern stem from changes in 
political institutions, in the general policy process or policy processes in 
related fields, the spectrum of technological, demographic, and cultural 
developments mentioned above, as well as feedback from the actual problem 
 7
situation. Examples, are some specific and general external sources of 
change linked to the five elements of public governance (cf. Bressers & 
O’Toole 1995): 
– Levels and scales of governance: Rise of the European Union; 
– Actors in the policy network: Rise of environmental and nature 
organizations;  
– Problem perception and objectives: Rise of environmental degradation 
information; 
– Strategy and instruments: Rise of general ideological preference for 
indirect and procedural instrumental strategies; and 
– Responsibilities and resources for implementation: Rise of proportion of 
(relatively) independent and businesslike organized implementation 
organizations, including privatization of water management.  
 
While these fundamental sources of change agents are grouped by separate 
elements of the regime, we will use in the empirical research uses a general 
categorization of the more direct change agents that evolve from these 
fundamental ones: 
a. European Union originated policy pressures; 
b. National regime developments; 
c. Problem pressures; 
d. Various other pressures (e.g. rise of environmental NGO’s).  
 
These groups of change agents can be related to the development of regimes. 
The regime can be portrayed as moving from one stage to another. As long 
as one acknowledges that various intermediate and mixed situations are 
possible and probable, such stages can be a useful heuristic.  
 
Figure 2 Regime developments 
                    Coherent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Fragmented 
 
Simple                 Complex 
Single elements              Multiple elements 
 
 Development / Time 
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The integration of regimes can be described in terms of extent and 
coherence. The extent of a regime is the scope of the uses and users that are 
regulated by one or more of the regime’s elements. Coherence is the degree 
to which these elements fit together. Very simple regimes regulate only one 
resources use or user. It’s the way - in theory previously unregulated - 
resources begin to be a subject of regimes. Furthermore, relatively singular 
(or simple) regimes (one level, one governing actor, one problem aspect - 
e.g. a certain use or user - one instrument, one implementing agency) will 
not need coherence. Only after growth in complexity does coherence become 
a relevant concept. But then, it is by no means a logical follow up. Complex 
but fragmented regimes are empirically quite common.2 While more 
complexity is part of a stream of societal developments that seem to increase 
as time goes by, both coherence and fragmentation seem to be common 
developments. 
 
When we speak of complexity it means that regimes can be characterized by 
multiple formats in most of their elements. The most eminent feature is the 
gradual increase of the domain of the regime, that is the uses and users 
regulated by one or more parts of the regime. We will refer to this crucial 
variable as the regime’s extent. Regimes with an insufficient extent are by 
definition weak as guardians of sustainable use, while some relevant parts of 
the domain go unregulated. With it also comes an increase in relevant 
property and use rights. The elements of governance tend to differentiate 
too: more layers and scales, more actors, and more perceptions of the 
problem and accompanying goals are involved, more instruments are part of 
the policy mix and more organizations share responsibilities for 
implementation. 
Thus, complexity as such is not wrong. Most of the time, growing 
complexity is an answer to real needs and developments. Societies generally 
grew into more complexity during most of modern times. The sector of 
water management is no exception to that general course of development. A 
growing complexity in governance can be viewed as a logical adaptation to 
that development. This leads to the first hypothesis:  
 
 
2 In fact, while integration has clear theoretical advantages, it comes at a price. Every form 
of integration creates the need for additional interaction and increases transaction costs, at 
least initially. 
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2.4 Change toward more coherent regimes 
While the growth of complexity in water management regimes seems a fairly 
straightforward part of a more general development in society, integration as 
a development is not. (See Figure 2) While the term ‘integration’ is common 
in most policy papers (e.g. ‘integrated water management’), in this project 
we choose to use the term coherence instead, for the reason that, in most 
policy papers the term integration is used in a sense that implicitly or 
explicitly includes an increase in the domain of the regime, the extent to all 
relevant users and uses. Therefore, we believe that integration as it is used in 
the policy sphere is a combination of what we call extent and coherence. For 
the sake of conceptual clarity and the possibility to adapt to the meaning of 
the term integration in policy practice, we use these terms further when 
appropriate, and reserve ‘integration’ for the combination of the two.  
 
The resource regime consists of two components and their mutual 
relationships: the regulative system of property and use rights and the public 
governance system. Consequently we discern three forms of coherence: 
1. internal coherence of the public governance component of the regime, 
2. internal coherence of the property rights component of the regime, and 
3. external coherence between the public governance and property rights 
components.  
 
By coherence of the public governance component we mean the following. 
When more than one layer of government is dealing with the same water 
resource (as is often the case), then coherence means inter alia that the 
activities of these layers of government are recognized as mutually 
dependent and influencing each others’ effects. When more than one actor or 
target group is involved in the policy, coherence means that there is a 
substantial degree of interaction in the policy network. When more than one 
use or user is causing the sustainability problem, coherence means that the 
various resulting objectives are analyzed in one framework so that deliberate 
choices can be made if and when goals are conflicting. The same holds for 
instrumental strategies that are used to attain the different objectives, as well 
Hypothesis 1 
 
The observed change agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead 
to more differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes), but 
not without additional prerequisites to more coherent regimes. 
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as for the different instruments in a mix to attain one of these objectives. To 
conclude, coherence of the organization of implementation means that 
responsibilities and resources of various persons or organizations that are to 
contribute to the application of the policy are co-ordinated, or these actors 
themselves are co-ordinated.  
 
The internal coherence of the property rights system is threatened when 
property or use rights are given to actors for uses that threaten uses already 
granted to others. This can have several background reasons. Sometimes use 
rights that were long seen as non-rival and thus compatible can become rival 
ones by a drastic increase in use, or by the use of new techniques. The 
internal coherence of the property rights system is thus the degree to which 
the interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in 
reality are reflected within and between the property and use rights. The 
essence of this variable is that property and use rights of one actor do not 
inherently or under given circumstances make it unavoidable to clash with 
other rights and/or with the sustainability of the resource, without external 
intervention to prevent it. 
 
The two components of the resource regime lack external coherence in case 
of a mismatch between actors targeted by the public governance system and 
actors with relevant property and use rights. In the second place a mismatch 
of the goods and services involved in both systems might also lead to a lack 
of coherence and thus change towards more coherence. 
 
Important change (even if they involve change towards ‘consensual 
management’ or the like) often involves some kind of conflict, struggle or 
manipulation, with losers also involved. Even though these changes are 
heading towards integration, the change process itself will often involve 
overt or hidden conflicts (as observed in several of the case studies). Such 
opposition can also lead to ‘failed’ or partial regime shifts towards 
coherence, when changes in one element of the regime are encapsulated, 
rather than followed by matching changes in the other elements of the 
regime.  
So, a change towards coherence occurs only when relevant actors 
acknowledge that coherence is necessary to prevent further deterioration of 
the resource and take action. Coherence is not a spontaneous development. 
Unlike an increase in complexity, then, developments in the direction of 
more coherence need some sort of deliberate attempt by motivated actors. 
This all leads to the question under what conditions such attempts will be 
relatively successful. 
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Conditions for coherence  
Change agents and conditions belong to the same set of causal factors. We 
distinguish them for the reason that the ‘conditions’ are often forgotten. 
Causal explanations are often sought in the form of ‘new’ and ‘provocative’ 
factors that are labeled as the ‘causes’. In reality, this image of causality 
often forgets the array of factors to which the analyst is used as being the 
‘normal’ status (causal factors that one is inclined to forget about). It might 
then be delusory to think that the ‘causes’ really are the complete 
explanation of what happens.  
A simple example may clarify this. When a fire burns a house and one 
seeks the cause, one will be looking for sources of fire (e.g. an electrical 
short circuit) and exceptional forms of flammable material (e.g. a leaking 
cooking gas container). That there is a great deal of flammable material and 
sufficient oxygen in a normal house will be considered ’normal’ or not even 
considered at all, while these factors are, of course, as essential as the 
previous ones. 
In our cases, the division between the ‘extraordinary’ causes (that we 
labeled ‘change agents’) and the ‘normal’ conditions are not as clear cut as 
in the example. Nevertheless, also in the case studies analyzed in this paper 
similar change agents sometimes set in motion a development towards 
coherence. Compare similar seeds sown in different seedbeds. For us, the 
reasons why similar problem pressures all over Europe and similar EU and 
even national developments have dissimilar effects on water management 
regimes at the case level are interesting. Here the ‘conditions’ enter the 
picture. We hypothesize the following relationships: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Attempts to change regimes into a more coherent status will have relatively 
more success when: 
– There is already a longer tradition of co-operation in the water 
management sector. 
– There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of 
non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner 
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).  
– There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-
win situations’ (joint opportunities). 
– There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and 
altering the public governance pattern in his interest when no solution is 
reached (credible alternative threat). 
– There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for 
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces). 
 (see appendix for indicators for these types of conditions) 
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2.5 The sustainability implications of more integrated institutional 
resource regimes 
The sustainability of a given institutional resource regime depends on its 
property and use rights component, the public governance component, and 
the interaction between these. The expectation that more integrated regimes 
will ceteris paribus perform better for sustainability is part of European 
political ideology on water management. Here we will theoretically underpin 
this relationship only briefly. First we make some remarks on how we dealt 
with the variable ‘sustainability of the use of the natural resource’. 
 
There are many indicators that can genuinely be considered to represent 
aspects of sustainability (cf. the ‘good status’ as specified in the EU water 
directive. It is not the purpose of our research to assess the overall 
sustainability of the resource use. Though, for various reasons, it is hard to 
give an overall assessment of the sustainability of the regime, it is less 
difficult to assess whether the concrete regime changes lead in the direction 
of more or less sustainability. 
The overall sustainability of resource use was beyond our capacity as 
social scientists to judge. Furthermore we were especially interested in the 
effects of the observed regime changes. This starting point is also part of the 
solution to the first problem. The assessment was concentrated on the 
implications of the observed regime changes for indicators that are relevant 
to sustainability. Developments in sustainability of use that clearly had 
nothing to do with observed regime changes, for instance climate change or 
rapid economic development, were excluded from the judgment.  
The balance between environment, natural resource protection and risk 
avoidance on one hand and the economic and social implications of these 
ecological changes and/or measures taken to achieve them on the other hand 
is a hard nut to crack. We weren’t inclined to judge in favor of increased 
sustainability without some ecological improvements, even though economic 
or social indicators might have improved. Here we also paid attention to the 
relevant EU ‘good status’ indicators.  
 
That a sufficient extent is a precondition for a benign effect on the 
sustainability of the use has been previously explained. Non-regulated uses 
and users will tend to disrupt the regime effects on sustainable use.  
The internal coherence of the property and use rights component is 
important for the sustainability of resource use since such coherence enables 
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stakeholders to better come to an agreement to guard a sustainable use even 
without government interference (Ostrom 1998; Sandler 1992). 
The internal coherence of the public governance component is important 
because it lessens the chance that negative side-effects of one element (level, 
actor, instrument, etceteras) undo the positive effects of another element (cf. 
Ligteringen 1996). Stronger coherence will also increase the visibility and 
feasibility of chances to create more synergy of the various elements. More 
coherence can also lead to less initial uncertainty, and increase in 
information exchange and trust, important for dealing with uncertainties (cf. 
Arentsen, Bressers & O’Toole 2000). The chances also get better for 
productive combinations of motivation, information and balance of power 
with the actors involved in policy implementation processes (cf. Bressers 
2004).  
The external coherence between the property & use rights component 
and the governance component deals with the degree to which the proper 
connections are made between the elements of governance (for instance 
policy instruments) and the relevant aspects of property and use rights. For 
instance: are the actors that hold the relevant property and use rights also the 
designated targets of such policy instruments?  
 
All in all this leads to the last hypothesis:  
 
 
3 Case study design  
3.1 Selection of cases 
In the research on which this paper is based, the Euwareness project, two 
cases are studied in each of the six participating countries. The main criteria 
for the selection of the cases were:   
Hypothesis 3 
 
a) Regimes with a deficient extent will be more likely lead to degradation of 
water resources or inability to protect the ecological functions of the water 
resource, than regimes with a larger extent. 
b) Regimes with a large ‘extent’, but with low coherence will more likely lead 
to degradation of water resources or inability to protect the ecological 
functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar extent but a 
higher degree of coherence. 
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– The demarcation of a case should follow the hydrological and 
geographical boundaries of a water basin at a regional scale or with a 
tributary character. 
– We have been looking for cases of rivalry between heterogeneous / 
homogenous uses/users of the same water resource. We preferred cases 
where several rivalries show up to allow intra-case analysis. It was not 
necessary that these rivalries are manifest in the whole case area, they 
might also be at stake in just a part of the case area.  
– There was a preference for cases where not only public ownership but 
also private ownership of water resources could be found. 
– Cases should be selected on the presence of at least attempts to obtain 
transitions towards more coherence during the last two decades. 
 
The sample of case studies is based on a combination of similarities and 
differences. In some respects, it seeks similarities (e.g. medium size river 
basins) that define boundaries of the research subject. In some respects, it 
deliberately encompasses different situations (e.g. ‘wet’ cases and ‘dry’ 
cases). But the most significant decision has to do with how the cases relate 
to the three main variable-groups, since these relations influence the 
inferences that can be drawn about the hypotheses that relate to these 
variables.  
There are various modes of sample selection, depending on the sort of 
inferences one wants to make. On the surface, the last mentioned criterion, 
namely that there should be the ex ante impression that a serious attempt to 
attain more integration in the regime took place in the proposed case, looks 
similar to the other (similarity) criteria. Nevertheless, this criterion is a 
combination of an extreme case sampling strategy and a random variation 
driven strategy (cf. Patton 1980). It is extreme case sampling in the sense 
that it leaves out all possible cases where there is no ex ante evidence that 
attempts towards more integration have been made. The implication of this 
is that if we don’t find improved factual (‘real’) integration in our cases, the 
chances are slim that we shall find it on any large scale outside of our 
sample.  
It is also a random variation strategy though, since any attempt to attain 
more integration surely doesn’t imply its success in close observation. On 
the contrary, we expect to see anything, from major improvements to only 
symbolic alterations and everything in between, due to the various 
conditions of the case. To re-use a metaphor from above: we confine 
ourselves to cases where seeds have been sown, in the expectation that these 
will be shown to bear fruits to very divergent degrees. This gives us the 
opportunity to make an inventory of change agents observed and test 
expectations about beneficial conditions. On a separate case level, the 
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disadvantage is that in case that in practice little or no regime change 
towards more integration could be shown, it is not possible to look for 
sustainability effects of these non-existent regime changes. Nevertheless, on 
a comparative level we’ll find some variation in the independent variable, 
with the hypothesis to be tested that improved integration will show 
connections with some improved aspects of sustainable resource use.  
3.2 Case study protocol 
The case studies had two stages. The first one is a descriptive one, in which 
the emphasis lies on the story or stories to be told. The second one is an 
analytical one in which the values of the variables are assessed that play a 
role in the theory that is used in the intra- and/or inter-case comparisons to 
arrive at an answer to the research questions of the project (Dente, Fareri & 
Ligteringen 1998). In many cases, the case study will contain more than one 
story of regime change. This may imply developments that can be seen as 
partial coherence in geographical sub-units of the case study territory or 
between certain aspects of the resource use but not between others. Our 
proposal was not to submerge these sub-stories and force them into one 
over-all case description, but to pay separate attention to them against the 
background of descriptions of the more general case situation and 
development. Some of the cases contain general more or less independent 
developments or ‘stories’. In these examples, sub-cases may be discerned. 
There is only one case-story under the following conditions: 
– If there is only one (major) or at least only one selected rivalry; 
– If there is only one line of development or only one aspect with which the 
regime has changed; 
– If the regime changes observed are highly interdependent; and/or  
– If the rivalries in the case are highly interdependent.  
 
If none of these statements hold true, we discerned separate sub-cases when 
analyzing the variables and hypotheses. A sub-case is then a set of 
observations for which the above criteria do hold.3 In many instances, this 
also meant that not only regimes on the water resource, but regimes on land 
use, nature protection and other natural resources (e.g. fish) were also at 
stake.  
 
 
3 Compare a detective story in which more than one murder takes place. If these are 
interconnected it makes no sense, when analysing the plot, to divide them into sub-cases, 
but if they are just connected by the fact that they take place in more or less the same 
period, they will probably have quite different plots that require separate attention when 
analysed.  
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The analytical part of the case studies consists of the assessment of relevant 
variables (translating ‘real life’ observations into theoretical language) and 
the inferences and conclusions that can be based on these variables and their 
relationships.   
As an aid to the comparative analysis, questionnaire forms were used for 
the case study researchers to fill in. These ‘case study fact and assessment 
sheets’ represent the variables and indicators of the theoretical model. Their 
purpose was to summarize the case information in a uniform format so that it 
case is comparable along the lines of the theoretical variables and 
hypotheses. The exercises of filling in the forms also proved very helpful in 
getting a grip on the case analysis itself.  
Apart from the few short statements per variable (‘key facts’), the 
researchers were asked to use a five-point scale to score the variables in 
order to make the cases comparable. Of course such a score is not a fact, but 
a judgment, much like marks are with school test papers. Therefore, we also 
wanted to know the most relevant facts that they had in mind while scoring 
(‘key facts’). While it might give a case study researcher an uncomfortable 
feeling to transform observations into scores, in fact, it gave them an 
influence on the way the case study comparison is made. For when 
comparing cases one always makes, explicitly or implicitly, these kinds of 
judgments on the rating of variables. We chose to do so explicitly. 
The great advantage of this procedure is that the people who do the 
assessments have extensive and intensive knowledge about the cases at hand, 
often even more than they described in the reports. In this way, we tried to 
combine the best of both worlds: the depth of information realized in 
extensive case studies and the clarity and overview of a data-matrix enabling 
all kinds of comparative analysis (cf. Patton 1980). Compared with the 
direct, qualitative comparison of the case studies as reported, the approach 
diminishes the risk of bias that the comparative analyst is mislead by 
surprising, but anecdotal evidence of only one or two cases not 
representative of the relationships in the whole sample.  
 
Since sub-cases are treated as equal cases in the analysis of the assessments 
of the relevant variables, cases that are split into sub-cases are in a sense 
over-represented in the data for the comparative analysis. Therefore, we also 
constructed a ‘weighted database’ in which all cases were assigned four units 
of research. That means that when a case is not split into 2 or 4 sub-cases but 
analyzed as a single case, that case was included fourfold in the ‘weighted 
database’. All the analyses were also done with this ‘weighted database’. 
Rarely, though, did the results differ.  
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In addition, one might question whether the case study researchers were not 
unconsciously inclined to ‘fix’ the case by assessing the variables not 
independently of each other but having the scores on dependent variables 
influenced by their assessment of independent variables or vice versa. The 
demanded association with mentioned ‘key facts’ already gave some 
protection against this. Luckily, we were able to test this possible form of 
bias. In the theory, both the forces of the change agents and the conditions 
for change explain regime change. The latter are the less ‘visible’ elements 
of the causal set. In the case study reports, far more attention was paid to the 
various change agents than to the conditions. This is often a large part of the 
story in the reports. If the suspected form of bias were real, then one could 
expect the variables of ‘degree of regime change’ and ‘force of change 
agents’ to be scored by the researchers in such a way that they would 
correlate strongly. But the opposite is true: the force of change agents proved 
afterwards to be far less correlated with regime changes than the conditions 
are. This attests that the researchers assessed the variables independently on 
their own merits. 
 
4 The results of the comparative analysis 
This section presents the results of the comparative analysis. This is based on 
the assessments of cases (including sub-cases) by the researchers of the main 
variables of the theory. These assessments were based on ordinal scales with 
five values. The 24 (sub)cases and 13 variables per case are of course too 
many to be handled in a purely qualitative way. Therefore the analysis below 
mostly uses descriptive and analytical statistics that are apt for ordinal level 
variables. Some of the main conclusions are illustrated by real life examples 
from the case studies. 4 
In this section we start first in 4.1 by presenting the developments for the 
central variable, the regime changes. Thereafter we relate them first as 
independent variable with the sustainability of the resource use. In 4.3 the 
regime changes are themselves the dependent variable and we consider 
which incentives and circumstances have influenced them.  
 
4 These illustrations are derived from the case studies that are described in Bressers and 
Kuks (2004). 
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4.1 Regime changes 
What interests us here is the degree to which the listed aspects of the regime, 
separately and as a set, moved in the direction of more integration (extent 
and coherence) in the cases studied. 
The extent is the degree of completeness of the domain of the regime in 
terms of relevant uses and users. In most of the cases and sub-cases in the 
study the extent of the water resource regime changed positively, in many 
cases even to include more or less all relevant uses and users. Almost always 
the introduction or the increase in valuation of the protection of the 
environment and nature are part or even the core of the extent changes. 
Sometimes new human uses like tourism are the extra issues that are taken 
into account. Where ecological values were already incorporated, new issues 
might arise, like diffuse agricultural pollution.  
 
The internal coherence of public governance is the degree to which the 
interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in 
reality, are reflected within and between the contents of the elements of 
public governance. The internal coherence of public governance generally 
increased too, but less than the extent. Almost nowhere could a ‘full 
coherence’ statement be made and in several instances only small 
improvements occurred. The changes in the internal coherence of public 
governance in most cases included aspects of all five elements of public 
governance: levels and scales, actors and networks, perspectives and 
objectives, strategies and instruments, and responsibilities and resources for 
implementation.  
 
Illustration 1: Remaining difficulties with non-river basin jurisdictions 
In France the SAGE process has generated a collective dynamic. Among other 
things the extent of the regime that was slowly built before, was quickly 
enlarged. The SAGE process could build on the gradually increased openness 
to cooperation that emerged over the last 25 years. The SAGE procedure has 
led to awareness of most (and new) stakeholders that they are not the only one 
‘main’ user. But that doesn’t always imply that there is participation from all 
actors or this participation is dedicated to reinforcement of collective action, 
but rather considered by some powerful users as a way to get information that 
helps them to keep their power. They proceed actually in behind-the-scene 
negotiations. Therefore, the participation is often only to defend one’s own 
interests. Some powerful actors, like industrialists, abstain from further 
participation once their interests are safeguarded, mainly because their 
management of water and wastewater relies upon technical supports (i.e. when 
their demand is satisfied they often don’t see an interest in participating any 
more since they cannot really get more assets). 
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The main problem remains that there can be lack of co-ordination or even 
competition between state administrations at the regional and departmental 
levels. There can be incoherence in rules and public actions when 
administrations share the same river. In the case of the Sèvre Nantaise, where 
the river is the boundary between two Departments, you can take all the water 
you want on one side, while it is forbidden on the other side. (Isabelle Verdage, 
Jean-Marc Dziedzicki & Corinne Larrue, Sèvere Nantaise case study) 
 
The internal coherence of the property rights is the degree to which the 
interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in 
reality, are reflected within and between the property and use rights. The 
essence of this variable is that property and use rights of the one do not 
inherently or under the given circumstances cause rival uses to unavoidably 
affect the sustainability of the resource, without external intervention. With 
the internal coherence of the property rights the picture is somewhat more 
differentiated. In two cases no improvement or even new inconsistencies 
occurred. But there were also four cases with a rather complete (change to) 
coherence in this respect. Generally when absolute limits of the resource are 
at stake (water, fish) the property and use rights are used more for self-
regulatory regimes, than when the protection of the quality of the resource 
(water, landscape, shores) is at stake. For the water resource in a stricter 
sense this means that predominant protection by property and use rights 
occurs more in the ‘dry’ cases than in the ‘wet’ cases. In ‘wet’ cases property 
and use rights are often restricted and must give way to public governance in 
order to improve the sustainability of the resource use. At least, this seems to 
be common practice. 
Here, for instance, developments were reported like the transfer of shares 
in relevant private and public companies, privatization, gradual acceptance 
of the water body as a common good, the lack of introduction of concession 
system with new uses, introduction of tradable fishing rights, multi-level 
issues like state ownership as a basis to allow new uses (e.g. to issue gas 
drilling concessions), while provinces and municipalities hold the public 
authority to protect other uses, the redistribution of property and use rights, 
disposition rights, the buying of land by a user or a public authority to solve 
conflicting property and use rights, expropriation for similar reasons (rarely 
and sometimes on the basis of ‘expropriation agreements’, as in Spain), 
regulatory unification of the property of land and water, the organization of 
users, the acknowledgement of traditional and ‘de facto’ use rights of some 
users, agreements (between fishers and kayakists or irrigators and fishermen) 
to share water use and the withdrawal of informal use rights.  
 
The external coherence between public governance and property rights is 
the degree to which the interdependencies in the water system and its 
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management are reflected in the interdependencies between public 
governance and the property and use rights. External coherence between 
public governance and property rights changed considerably in half of the 
cases for the better and only modestly or less in the other half.  
Here the following developments were reported, among others: expired 
use rights were gradually transferred to other (public or semi-public) 
institutions, the aim of minimal water flow was incorporated as a sort of use 
right for environmental protection, an EU inspired programme gave 
compensation to farmers for not exerting their use right to part of their farm 
land, some technical measures required new responsibilities and resources 
for implementation that demanded changes in property rights, adaptation of 
use rights to public policy aims, voluntary restrictions of the property right 
holder accepting public policy aims (one of the Belgian cases), the 
localization of drinking water industry was problematic but not considered 
as a question per se, subsidies allowed the regional administration to 
influence nature management by owners, modification of property rights by 
creation of zones that were liable to flooding, concessions were given by law 
to user communities, a policy plan to improve the information for self-
governing user communities by the development of a census to prevent free 
riders and by studies, creation of (semi-)public bodies or platforms where 
practically every user is represented, policies opening up to take also other 
users than those with a use right to the water itself into account (tourists, 
fishermen, nature), incorporation of relevant use right holders (farmers, 
tourists) as targets in public water policy. 
 
The overall assessment of the regime change is clearly that in most cases 
there were considerable improvements on many of the important aspects. 
Nevertheless seven occasions of more or less failed attempt to regime 
change and 3 occasions where the results were better than average and where 
at the end of the case period one could really speak of integrated water 
management also occurred.5 
 
Illustration 2: An example of broad improvements 
In the Matarranya river process, there are clear signals of regime change, both 
regarding extension and coherence of the water regime. The extension of the 
 
5 While 7 of the 12 areas studied were analyzed as single cases and the other 5 split into 17 
sub-cases, one might suspect that the sub-cases are on average more coherent than the 
single cases, while each sub-case only deals with a part of what is relevant. We tested 
whether such an artificial ‘coherence’ bonus was indeed observable in the assessments. 
This was hardly the case. The assessments of the internal coherence of public governance, 
the internal coherence of property rights and the external coherence were almost the same 
with the single (un-split) cases as with the sub-cases in the sample of 24. 
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water uses increases as it includes irrigation, population supply, cattle rising, 
nature protection and tourism. Rivalries between users can be interpreted in 
territorial terms (intra-basin driven rivalries). There is also an increase of 
public governance coherence, as it regards levels and scales, multilevel 
interaction and networks. The most relevant event proving the increase of 
governance coherence is the Water Agreement reached by the main actors 
operating at the river basin level. This agreement is the outcome of a process in 
which a wide range of actors operating at different scales of governance 
interact: the regional government promoters environmental initiatives; local 
actors appeal to EU regulation as a legal resource by local actors; the Central 
Union of Irrigation Communities is created as a body representing all irrigation 
communities at the basin; PLADEMA - an ad hoc local association - 
aggregates and mobilizes actors against the construction of hydraulic works; 
the Ebro river basin administration negotiates with the local irrigation 
communities; and the Ministry of Environment finances the construction of 
lateral pools. These actors, especially those located at the river basin, share a 
perception of risk caused by an extreme situation of drought among the basin 
actors and progressively adopt a new water culture. 
Regarding the internal coherence of property rights, some improvements can 
be identified: the Ebro river basin Plan establishes water needs and uses as well 
as a minimal ecological flow; some maladjustments between legal aspects and 
real practices of the CHE and the Central Users Community increase its level 
of influence regarding decisions on the watering out of the Pena dam and the 
distribution of water; traditional use rights of some users are respected; and a 
kind of de facto use rights are given to illegal users of water by the Irrigation 
Communities of the basin. After the signature of the Water Agreement, the 
external coherence between public governance and property rights improves to 
a certain extent. All the main water users have proved to be able to negotiate 
and reach an agreement based on a common perception of the river as a key 
element for the future development of the basin. (Meritxell Costejà, Nuria Font 
& Joan Subirats, – Matarrana River case study) 
4.2 Implications of regime changes for sustainable use 
The approach to the assessment of this variable (-group) is the following: the 
researchers started with the rivalries that are at stake in the case story or 
stories. In the first instance, the assessment of the changes in the 
sustainability of the resource use is limited to the natural/environmental 
indicators that are directly at stake in these rivalries. Without any ecological 
improvements the researchers were not inclined - in wealthy Western Europe 
- to judge an improved sustainability even when economic parameters would 
have improved. In the second instance, the social and economical 
development consequences of the changes in these indicators and/or the 
measures taken for this purpose are also taken into account. In the last 
instance, a marginal check was performed to see whether the observed 
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changes had important side effects on other natural resource/environmental 
indicators and whether these in turn had indirect social and economic 
consequences.  
 
Illustration 3: Rivalries and ecology 
In the Idro Lake and Chiese River case the problem generates from conflicting 
interest of the various users of the lake and the water basin. The conflicts occur 
between water uses for agriculture, hydropower production, tourism, ecological 
balance, and protection from risks related to flooding, soil erosion, and land 
sliding. As a response the use of water was managed not only accounting for 
water needs, but also for water availability. Environmental and land 
conservation was supported by the maintenance of a constant minimal vital 
flow, even in summer and controlling the speed of lake depletion. The 
maximum water-storage level was reduced to avoid the risk of flooding. 
(Bruno Dente & Alessandra Goria, Idro Lake and Chiese River case study) 
 
Often the picture for the economic consequences is somewhat mixed. As 
negative economic consequences we found the financial costs and/or 
restrictions for the sectors involved (agriculture, fishery, resource extraction 
or industry) and in some cases higher water prices are mentioned. On the 
positive side the following economic phenomena were often mentioned: 
gains for tourism, avoidance of future costs, job creation and job 
safeguarding, and an improved natural resource basis for further economic 
development. Occasionally lower water costs and increases in productivity 
were also reported.  
 
Illustration 4: Nature reserves 
In the Dender basin, the structure of the economy is modifying. The relative 
importance of industry and agriculture diminishes as tourism is increasing. In 
this context changes in the ownership of land are occurring. In fact, 
associations for the protection of nature buy land to the farmers. Their purpose 
is to develop natural areas, creating ‘green corridors’ throughout the region. 
This activity was initiated and is still supported by the Region. The Flemish 
Region subsidies the acquisitions. Nature associations negotiate with individual 
farmers. The farmers are often aged and then get additional financial resources 
(to the pension). The two groups of actors benefit from the subsidies of the 
Region that still manages the conduct of the policy. (David Aubin & Frédéric 
Varone, Dender River Basin case study) 
 
Illustration 5: Tourism development in the Vesdre basin 
The low quality of the Vesdre creates rivalries. Pollution prejudices the 
development of tourism, the only economic reconversion expected for this 
former industrialized area. At the same time purification of urban wastewater 
has come compulsory. The tourist sector and the water purification sector are 
mutually supportive. In both cases the European Union plays the role of 
institutional interface. In the first place it allocates structural funds. The valley 
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of the Vesdre is classified as an area in economic reconversion. Both tourism 
development project and purification plants benefit from the subsidies. In the 
second place, the EU compels the Member States to purify domestic 
wastewater. As a consequence, the competence authority, i.e. the Walloon 
Region, developed an ambitious catch up policy and raised the necessary 
funds. The Vesdre river basin is one of the main recipients. This context should 
allow of tourist activities in the valley to take off. (David Aubin & Frédéric 
Varone, Vesdre River Basin case study) 
 
While the economic consequences were mixed, the social consequences 
were often very positive and remarkably varied. The only negative social 
consequences mentioned were limitation of land ownership rights and a 
negative impact on the landscape, both mentioned once. By contrast, the 
positive social consequences include: modernization of agriculture, 
development of new associations of people, more open public debates and 
more information for the people in general, improved feeling of safety, 
prevention of population decline and maintenance of young population, 
fairer distribution between upper and lower communities, resolution of 
conflict in the local area, improved living conditions, and the reinforcement 
of the qualities of the river as a key element of social identity. 
 
Illustration 6: Concertation 
In Wallonia, the tributary basin of the Hoëgne-Wayai hosted a conflict between 
the fishers and the local mineral water producer. Fishers were complaining 
about accidental discharges of caustic soda that caused fish disease. During the 
case, the actors exchanged violent arguments via the press. In order to come 
out of the conflict, the fishers’ federation proposed to the mineral water 
producer to make a river contract. The river contract is a non-binding, 
voluntary local concertation mechanism. All the local actors meet and discuss 
their problems. A monitoring network is put in place. The rivalry is broadened 
to the whole range of uses. All the quality aspects are taken into account. 
However, every action is done on a voluntary basis by the actor concerned 
actor and at its own expenses. Even if results in terms of water quality are 
mitigated, the initial conflict moved into cooperation and then every local 
water actor adopted a resource logic. (David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, Vesdre 
River Basin case study) 
 
Our expectations (hypothesis 3) regarding the relation between the regime 
(change) and the sustainability of institutional resource regimes were:  
a) Regimes with a deficient extent will be more likely to lead to degradation 
of water resources or inability to protect the ecological functions of the 
water resource, than regimes with a larger extent. 
b) Regimes with a large extent, but with low coherence will be more likely 
to lead to degradation of water resources or inability to protect the 
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ecological functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar 
extent but a higher degree of coherence.   
 
Indeed, the relation between the extent and the sustainability estimates is 
rather weak and hardly significant, if one leaves out the coherence of the 
regime aspects (Spearman’s Rho is .342 with one-tailed sign. p = 0.051, all 
calculations n = 24). The relation between the general assessment of regime 
change and the assessment of sustainability is however much stronger (rho = 
.533, p = .004). In a scatterplot this is made visual (see Figure 3). Remember 
that several (sub) cases share their values in this plot. This is shown by the 
size of the dots. 
 
Figure 3 Relation between the general assessment of regime change and the 
assessment of sustainability 
 
Of the separate regime aspects, by far the most important factor was the 
coherence of public governance. It correlated even more strongly with the 
assessment of sustainable resource use than the general regime change.  
 
The correlations of the development of separate regime aspects with the 
development towards a more sustainable resource use are as follows (all 
correlations in rho): 
 
General regime change    .533  (p = .004) 
a. Extent         .342 (p = .051) 
b. Coherence governance   .686 (p = .000) 
c. Coherence property rights  .527 (p = .004) 
d.  External coherence b. & c.  .380 (p = .034) 
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Illustration 7: Sustainability and regime changes 
Regime changes in the case of the Mula river have some positive impacts on 
sustainability including the environmental, economic and social dimensions. 
Regarding the environmental dimension, energy and water savings are 
considerable, there is a decrease in water loses, some measures to avoid the 
overexploitation of wells and aquifers are adopted, and a minimal ecological 
flow is established. Regarding the economic dimension, the price of water to 
farmers is lower than it used to be and the productivity of the huerta improves. 
Finally, regarding the social dimension, there are some training programs for 
farmers and an improvement of life quality. In general terms, the positive 
impacts on sustainability seem to be more related to the increase of internal and 
external coherence rather than to the increase of extent. (Meritxell Costejà, 
Nuria Font, Anna Rigol & Joan Subirats – Mula River case study) 
 
All in all, the conclusion is that there is only weak support for our first 
expectation here (hypothesis 3a): that an increased extent contributes as such 
to a more sustainable resource use. The support for the second expectation 
(hypothesis 3b) - that increased coherence contributes to a more sustainable 
resource use - is much stronger. Though this can be regarded as supportive 
evidence for the proponents of ‘integral water management’, it should be 
considered that this isn’t a sort of ‘mechanic’ causal relationship. It still 
holds true that ‘the devil is in the details’. 
 
Illustration 8: Voluntary restriction 
The lower part of the Vesdre river basin was regularly under water due to water 
releases from the dams of Eupen and the Gileppe. During periods of heavy 
rainfalls, the dam reservoirs reached their maximum capacity and it became 
dangerous to stock more water. People and communes downstream were 
complaining. Consultations went on to circumscribe the problem in the basin 
despite the lack of regulation. In fact the manager of the dam agreed with the 
main user of the reservoir, i.e. the drinking water producer, to constitute a 
higher safety margin in case of significant rainfall. The two actors have 
endorsed the risk of water shortages in drought periods. The dams no longer 
threaten the downstream part of the basin. Informal agreements were later 
extended to other consequences of water releases, i.e. minimum flows and 
extraordinary releases for canoeing. Moreover, this kind of agreement 
generated an extended mobilization of all the local actors involved in water 
quantity management as the problem of floods remains, but on different 
patterns. (David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, Vesdre River Basin case study) 
 
4.3 Explaining regime changes by change agents and conditions 
Change agents  
This is the combined force of the listed change agents as an impetus to set in 
motion regime changes in the direction of more integration. The joint force 
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of the identified change agents in the cases was assessed as moderate (4x), 
strong (12x) or even very strong (5x). Only in 3 (sub)cases was it assessed as 
weak or absent. The types of change agents mentioned were EU originated 
pressures, national regime developments, problem pressures and various 
other case circumstances. In 13 of the 24 cases EU policies were mentioned 
as relevant.6 In all but two cases national policy and regime changes were 
influential.7 In 19 cases was there influence from problem pressure.8 In 10 
cases various other circumstances were mentioned.9  
 
Illustration 9: Example of a set of change agents on case level 
Change agents in the case of the Mula River include the leadership of regional 
government, which has technical and financial resources and support from 
other institutions (EU, national administration) in the elaboration of the 
Modernization Plan. Of crucial importance is the ability of the Irrigation 
Community to break the Heredamiento monopoly of water distribution. 
Problem pressure also becomes an important change agent -- drought 
conditions precipitate a deep crisis of the traditional structure of the Mula 
huerta. In addition, policy initiative and new scientific knowledge about the 
state of the resource are important variables leading to a regime change. 
 
6 As such a great variety of EU policies were mentioned as relevant: the standard for 
minimal flow of rivers, (national laws that were triggered by) directives on the water basis 
system, the 1991 waste water treatment directive (5x), phosphate and nitrate standards, 
fishery policies, the 1972 wild birds and 1992 habitat directives with their special 
protected areas (3x), the 1975 drinking water directive (3x) (and the role of the European 
Court of Justice to force implementation), the regional development policy with its 
structural funds (2x). More generally various EU regulations were used as arguments in 
the debates, even when not self-enforcing. 
7 Apart from various ‘normal’ water (and some nature) policies, some more regime oriented 
pressures were also mentioned: promoting regime development at the level of the water 
basins (3x), laws demanding (land-use) planning (4x), acts that allow the government as 
owner of the water to regulate fishing on the basis of considerations of nature protection, 
environmental impact assessment, white papers pushing for ‘integral water management’ 
(3x), federalisation (Belgium), legislation allowing expropriations and indemnities in 
favour of flood protection, and the designation of parts of the basin as nature protection 
area. Note that several of these are not or might not be independent from the relevant EU 
policies! 
8 With the problems at hand there is a clear division between ‘wet’ cases (the majority) and 
‘dry’ cases. In the dry cases increased use by agriculture and tourism are main problem 
causes. In the wet cases pollution and the risk of flooding are the most mentioned 
problems. For almost all cases the increased value attached to nature and environment 
considerations makes these enter the picture as ‘new’ problem pressures.  
9 Some examples are: the expiration of concessions for irrigation, changing market 
regulations pushing for new economic developments, state withdrawal from participation 
in economic developments, expanding land use for building, the break-down of traditional 
management regimes, experts providing new information, local and environmental 
associations and devoted individuals. 
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(Meritxell Costejà, Nuria Font, Anna Rigol & Joan Subirats – Mula River case 
study) 
 
Maybe national policy support is a necessary, though not a sufficient 
condition. Often the national government provided crucial resources like 
formal rules and money. The two cases where such influence was not 
reported had a very low overall force of change agents. But generally it is 
not the type of change agents or the presence of a variety of them that 
matters. Each change agent can ‘do the job’ of exerting a major ‘force of 
change agents’ if it is pressing enough.  
 
Our expectations (hypothesis 1) regarding the relation between the general 
force of the change agents and regime change was: “The observed change 
agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead to more 
differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes), but not 
without additional prerequisites to more coherent regimes.”  As expected of 
the various forms of regime change, only the extent seems directly related to 
the force of the change agents. For the other relations more is necessary. And 
these attempts to attain more coherence are expected to depend on several 
conditions.  
The correlation of ‘the combined force of all change agents’ with the 
general regime change in the direction of more integrated regimes, and with 
the separate regime aspects are as follows: 
 
General regime change    .200 (p = .175) 
a. Extent          .446 (p = .015) 
b. Coherence governance    .128  (p = .275)  
c. Coherence property rights   .072 (p = .369)  
d. External coherence b. & c.  .153 (p = .238)   
 
Illustration 10: Finding political will 
In Verviers, drinking water consumption has led to lead-poisoning for more 
than a century. Poisoning was due to lead pipes attacked by naturally acid 
water. Diverging interests and the weakness of knowledge around the nature of 
the contamination explained the status quo. The dam that provides water to the 
town had initially been build for industrial uses. The network was later 
extended to private housings and water declared to be drinking water without 
prior treatment. Acid water was very convenient for the industries because of 
its cleaning properties. This position was well reflected in the municipal 
council. The commune was the owner of the water distribution service. In 
1980, the EU drinking water directive set up constraining standards for lead 
concentration in drinking water. The commune of Verviers had to adapt but 
missed both the political will and the financial means. Finally, the building of a 
treatment plant was taken in charge by the Region and a deviation of the main 
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pipe did not counteract the industrial interest. Work began only when industry 
had guarantee on the unchanged properties of its water. The public health 
problem was taken into account without inducing any redistribution at the 
detriment of other water uses, industry in the present case. (David Aubin & 
Frédérich Varone, Vesdre River Basin case study) 
 
Illustration 11: Bottom-up regime changes 
Sometimes it was not national regime change influencing the extent of the 
regime at the case level, but the other way around. Here are two examples of 
bottom-up processes and subsequent ‘legitimization’ of local developments 
through national legislation in Switzerland.  
The process of regional regime inventions arising from local problem pressure 
which are subsequently supported and thus legitimated by changes in the 
policy design at federal level can be observed in both Swiss case studies. In the 
Seetal valley, the canton of Lucerne had already issued a notice in 1988 
reducing the restrictions on the number of production animals on farms from 
four to three livestock units per hectare. Even if this restriction was never really 
implemented at regional level, it served as a model for the introduction of the 
same restriction into the Federal Law on Water Protection of 1991. In the 
Maggia valley in the canton of Ticino, quantitative protection of the water 
resources dates back to 1976, anticipating the changes in the federal regime by 
a wide margin. At the level of the water basin, protective measures in terms of 
minimal residual flows were applied in 1982, a full 10 years before the 
enactment in the Federal Law on Water protection of 1991. (Corine Mauch & 
Adèle Thorens – Swiss case studies) 
 
Conditions 
This is the degree to which the listed conditions provide, separately and as a 
set, favorable or unfavorable conditions for regime changes in the direction 
of more integration (extent and coherence). 
Hypothesis 2 was that attempts to change regimes into a more integrated 
status would have relatively more success when: 
– There is already a longer tradition of thinking in terms of cooperation in 
the water management sector or such a thinking is built during the case 
early enough to influence later stages of the case history. 
– There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of 
non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this 
sooner or later will have to be stopped (joint problem).  
– There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-
win situations’ (joint opportunities). 
– There is a credible threat of a (potentially) dominant actor accumulating 
power and altering the public governance pattern in his own way and to 
his own interest when no solution is reached (credible alternative threat). 
– There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for 
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces). 
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Generally the researchers assessed that in their (sub)cases there was no very 
stimulating tradition of earlier co-operation between the actors involved in 
the rivalry/ies. Joint problem awareness has been present to some extent in 
several cases, though often only on a part of the relevant aspects or only with 
some of the relevant actors. There has been considerable differentiation 
between the cases in terms of the degree to which the actors involved saw 
chances to actually gain by solving the rivalry with a more integrated 
regime. In one case there was even a sense of joint loss. With the condition 
of a credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to solve the disputes 
to his own benefit there has been a considerable differentiation among the 
cases. Generally speaking the condition of institutional interfaces was 
somewhat better that most of the other conditions. Nevertheless, in many 
cases these were only a part of the relevant aspects or not functioning very 
well.  
All in all, the assessments of the conditions for regime change in many 
cases are rather favorable. In nine cases the conditions are viewed less 
favorably. Especially the awareness of joint chances and good institutional 
interfaces - and to a lesser extent an existing tradition of co-operation were 
all seen as important positive conditions for regime change. These 
assessments of the favorability of the conditions was especially related to the 
assessment of the institutional conditions (.679), joint chances (.508) and 
previous experiences with cooperation (.405). 
 
Lower assessments of the general conditions indeed correlate with smaller 
regime changes, as expected in hypothesis 3. The correlation is .687 (p = 
.000). Figure 4 shows this relationship in a visual way. 
 
Figure 4 The relation between favorable conditions and regime changes towards more 
integrated water management regimes 
CONDITIO
4,54,03,53,02,52,01,51,0,5
R
E
G
C
H
A
4,5
4,0
3,5
3,0
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
,5
 30 
 
Illustration 12: Polders and wateringues versus water floods 
All along the river Dender in Flanders, riparian landowners are involved in a 
particular kind of public administration, the polders and the wateringues. The 
polders and wateringues manage drainage on their territory. They finance their 
activity with direct taxation. Draining activities are in conflict with the need to 
create buffer zones. The competent authority for water quantity management 
on the Dender faces frequent floods of growing importance. As the problem 
pressure is growing, solutions introduced are residual. The weakness is due to 
an absence of common concern between the involved users. The water 
manager has no possibility to build new relief basins. It only builds dikes to 
divert the flood. It is not confronted with claims from the polders and 
wateringues that come under flow as a matter of tradition. Moreover, there is 
no real mechanism of concertation between the users and no coordination 
between the various competent authorities. Mutual information remains weak. 
Everyone is only preoccupied by the evacuation of water out of its territory. 
The problem should increase without a sustainable response is put in place. 
The only answer consists in building a huge pumping station at the mouth of 
the Dender. (David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, Dender River Basin case study) 
 
The assessment of the conditions not only correlated with the general regime 
change, but also with all other aspects of regime change.  
 
General regime change    .687 (p = .000) 
a. Extent          .721 (p = .000) 
b. Coherence governance    .798  (p = .000)  
c. Coherence property rights   .583 (p = .001)  
d. External coherence b. & c.  .527 (p = .004)   
 
Hypothesis 2 mentions the conditions separately. This implies that the 
various circumstances can have different effects. We have investigated this 
by a correlation analysis of all conditions mentioned with all regime aspects. 
Here we mention all significant relations. Also a few almost significant 
relationships are mentioned, with their uncertainty.  
The tradition of cooperation in the water management sector showed 
significant correlations only with the internal coherence of public 
governance (.416) and almost with the extent (.315, p = .067). 
The condition of a common understanding that the counteracting (side) 
effects of non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this 
sooner or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem) did not 
correlate significantly with any of the regime indicators. Closest was the 
correlation with the internal coherence of public governance (.313, p = .068). 
The notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-win 
situations’ (joint opportunities) again correlated with some regime indicators 
(coherence governance .509, external coherence .599) and with general 
 31
regime change (.554). The fact that the correlation of the awareness of ‘win-
win’ situations is even stronger with the external coherence between public 
governance and property rights than with the general regime change is 
striking. It might point to an often ‘public-private’ nature of such 
opportunities.  
The credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and altering 
the public governance pattern in his interest when no solution is reached 
(credible alternative threat) did not correlate significantly with any of the 
regime indicators. It almost significantly correlated with the extent, though 
(.305, p = .074). 
Last but not least, the existence of well functioning institutions that 
provide fertile ground for coherence attempts (institutional interfaces) 
correlates with the extent (.751, p = .000), internal coherence of public 
governance (.3431) and with the general regime change (.380). 
All in all, of the separate conditions (and the force of change agents) the 
joint opportunities and the institutional interfaces conditions (see the 
appendix for a specification of these factors in this study) stand out in the 
explanation of the various forms of regime changes.   
 
Illustration 13: Joint opportunities and institutional interfaces around the 
IJsselmeer 
Sometimes rival uses can nevertheless be turned into win-win situations. The 
shores of the Dutch IJsselmeer (Lake IJssel) have rival uses of inter alia nature 
(bird habitat) and tourism (boating marinas). Of course tourism on the other 
hand benefits from beautiful nature. Seeking the balance between the two uses 
can therefore be beneficial for both. With a homogeneous use like IJsselmeer 
fisheries there is rivalry between the users, but on the other hand all users have 
a certain interest in a just distribution of rights, and therefore may favor a 
regime that guarantees this while preventing a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This 
creates a basis for joint action that can be further exploited by having the right 
institutional interfaces in place.  
These institutional interfaces can be triggered by European and national 
measures. In the IJsselmeer case the national government founded a 
negotiation platform, a steering committee on the so-called corner lakes, a 
producers’ organization on fishery, environmental impact procedures (gas 
drilling) and land use planning procedures with open participation. Such 
institutions catalyzed the involvement of users and other citizens (cf. the EU 
WFD) and functioned sometimes as ‘policy brokers’ and sometimes as forms 
of ‘institutional leadership’. (Dave Huitema, IJsselmeer case study) 
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5 Outlook: our conclusions in the perspective of the 
European water management policy 
European water policy has developed along two lines - water quality and 
emission standards - that reflect different national views. The new European 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) is an attempt to reconcile the two 
approaches and to integrate water quantity aspects. The purpose of the WFD 
is to achieve good ecological quality for all waters inside the European 
Union, at the scale of water basins, where an authority implements integrated 
management programmes. The WFD should guarantee, as of 2015, a ‘good 
status’ for all ground- and surface waters, in quality and quantity, according 
to an eco-centered logic. In order to achieve this goal it promotes an 
integrated water management, i.e. a management that considers all the water 
aspects and legislation in a single picture and on a delineated territory, the 
water basin. The integration of control and action should occur for quality 
and quantity aspects, surface and groundwater, exploitation and preservation, 
objectives of quality and emission limit values and water policy vis-à-vis 
other policies. The WFD sets up guidelines and leaves significant room for 
manoeuvre to the Member States. The guidelines allow an evaluation and a 
comparison of the efforts developed by the Member States and their results.  
 
The main concepts of this paper relate closely to the central themes of the 
new European water policy. The ‘good status’ of the WFD is related to the 
ultimate dependent variable in our analysis, the degree of ‘sustainable use’, 
especially to the ecological aspect of sustainable use. However, even in the 
1996 communication leading to the WFD due attention is also paid to the 
‘evaluation of costs’. This aspect is reflected in the ‘economic consequences’ 
aspect of sustainable use. We observed that besides costs, economic 
consequences could be observed both positive and negative. A third aspect 
that was included in our research was that of the social consequences. Here a 
remarkable number of positive developments were reported from the case 
studies. Generally, a higher degree of sustainable use correlated with a more 
integrated regime at the water basin level, just as was expected by both the 
theory described in this paper and the ‘practical policy theory’ underlying 
the WFD. Though this can be regarded as supporting evidence, it should be 
considered that this isn’t a sort of ‘mechanical’ causal relationship. Under 
certain circumstances it can even be envisioned that more integration leads 
to deterioration of sustainable use. It still holds true that ‘the devil is in the 
details’. Nevertheless, empirically in our 24 cases the relationship between 
integrated management and the status of the water resources shown to 
correspond with the ideas guiding the WFD.  
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The main venue by which the new European water policy seeks to improve 
the good status of European waters is by ‘integrated water management at 
water basin scale’. In this paper the cases that are studied were not at the full 
water basin scale, but at the lower level of tributary river basins. The reason 
for this is that we believe that integration of management is a multi-level 
endeavor. At the higher level of international rivers like the Rhine or even 
large national rivers like the Loire, circumstances vary to such a degree that 
there is not one, but several sets of uses and users and consequently also 
multiple resource regimes needed at a sub-basin level. This is not to state 
that the full water basin should not be in need of coordinated management, 
but only that for impacting many uses and users, sub-regimes at a tributary 
river basin level are also needed. This idea is in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity that is explicitly endorsed in European water policy. 
The case studies concentrated on this level (with areas of some 500 to 2500 
km2) and found many interesting experiences with (attempts to achieve) 
more integrated water management. These illustrate the assumption of the 
European water policy that it is necessary to accept some variation of the 
institutional arrangements that are used to promote integrated management. 
Though the organization of management on a sub-basin level is left 
predominantly at the discretion of the member states, we think that at least 
devices for Europe-wide communication and exchange on experiences with 
integral water management on that level could be helpful for the actual 
practical implementation of the WFD.  This could be part of ‘joint 
implementation’ arrangements.  
Integrated water management in this dissertation is conceptualized with 
the help of the concepts of extent and coherence. The ‘extent’ of the regime 
reflects the elements of integration in the WFD that stress that all relevant 
directives and all waters in the area should be managed in a combined 
approach. We stress the completeness of the regime to regulate all relevant 
uses and users. The elements that stress multi-level (even international if 
necessary) and multi-actor (stakeholders and citizens) involvement and the 
coherent action guided by management plans are reflected in the concept of 
‘public coherence’. As a special feature of our research, not only the 
coherence of public governance, but also the coherence of the property & 
use rights regime and the coherence of the relation between public 
governance and property and use rights are included in the assessments. The 
study illustrates that these are important aspects of the water management 
regimes, especially - but not exclusively - when quantity issues are at stake. 
Theoretically it can be expected that inclusion of former socialist economies 
in Eastern Europe would increase the variation in the regimes of property 
and use rights considerably and would make this issue even more important. 
In Switzerland public policies that reduce use rights by more than 7% need 
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to include compensations acknowledging these rights. All aspects of 
integrated water management studied seem to make a difference, though not 
equally in all cases. The research in this paper has shown that special 
attention to the property and use rights affected and the relation between 
those and the public governance measures is a worthwhile extension of the 
focus of integrated water management.  
 
The integration between water management and other sector policies is in 
the new European water policy envisioned by the mechanisms embedded in 
‘full cost pricing’. In our cases we did not specifically encounter this subject. 
Consequently we don’t have a conclusion on full cost pricing. What we did 
encounter were a number of cases in which issues other than direct water 
issues entered the process of development of new water regimes. Examples 
are issues of landscape, wetlands and fishery, which were entered into the 
debate by interested actors. Though ‘full cost pricing’ could be important to 
send the right price signals to all actors, there will probably remain various 
rivalries that need a form of integrated water management that deliberately 
tries to bridge externally to other sector policies for coordination.    
 
The research in this paper did spend a great deal of effort in providing better 
insight into a variety of change agents and conditions that stimulate more 
integrated water management. We learned that integrated management 
regimes are not something that one can ‘proclaim into reality’. Deliberate 
attempts by motivated actors are surely needed to realize it in practice. We 
won’t repeat all our conclusions on this subject here, but concentrate on the 
points where EU policies come in.  
Among the change agents we have seen that in more than half of the 
cases EU directives and other policies play an important role. Among these 
directives are also some that are not directly ‘water directives’. Another 
observation is that national policies that are mentioned as leading to regime 
changes were often in their turn triggered or in any case related to EU 
directives.  
Even more important than the change agents mentioned proved to be the 
conditions for change. The European Union can have important - indirect - 
effects here too. A first observation is that European policies are often used 
in the internal debate at case level as arguments to pursue a certain position. 
This holds especially for NGOs and other actors with little formal power and 
of course when they want to move in the same direction as the relevant EU 
policy involved. Even when these policies are non-obligatory, in this way 
they have a certain influence. Of course, part of this influence is generated 
by the prospect that these policy lines will become more compelling after a 
while. So for the WFD aim of participation in water management, EU 
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policies can play an important role. Of the several conditions joint chances 
and institutional interfaces proved to be the most important. Both can be 
seen as venues at which to aim supplementary EU measures in the context of 
joint implementation, to improve the chances for regime changes in the 
direction of integrated water management.  
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Appendix 
 
The indicators for the relevant conditions used are: 
 
a Tradition of co-operation 
- a dominant policy ideology that supports integration 
- positive examples of integration known by the actors involved 
- mutual respect and trust in ‘fair play’ of the actors involved 
b Joint problem 
- knowledge bases in the form of reports and statements by respected sources on resource 
deterioration due to fragmentation 
- information symmetry between the actors involved on these points 
- a sense of responsibility for the future with the actors involved 
c Joint opportunities 
- knowledge bases from respected sources on opportunities stemming from more integration 
- information symmetry between the actors involved on these points 
- a sense of respect for each others’ interests among the actors involved 
d Credible alternative threat 
- sufficient imbalance of power favouring a dominant actor (government?) to enable 
unilateral action 
- information on alternative options to ‘solve’ the problem from the perspective of the 
dominant’s actor’s perspective 
- alternative option has more severe consequences for the other stakeholders than the specific 
form of integration would have 
e Institutional interfaces 
(not all indicators below are equally important to all forms of integration) 
- clarity of assigned responsibilities (to prevent territorial battles) 
- free and alert mass media to induce awareness of challenges to the system 
- legal or practical possibilities to protect negotiated compromises from continuous litigation 
- actors, independent or within the administration, with solely process objectives (brokers) 
- a small number of stakeholders or a strong representative organisation for the major groups 
of stakeholders to enable authoritative a small number of interaction processes  
- legal leeway for more integrative approaches  
- official (not only laws, but also white papers and the like) policy guidelines to achieve more 
integration in water management 
 
 
